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CASENOTES
It is respectfully submitted that the Florida Supreme Court, in weighing
these two principles, may have placed too much emphasis on the protection
of the public welfare to the detriment of an individual's constitutional
right. There is no question that a reasonable inspection of apartment
houses, restaurants, and hotels is necessary for the protection of public
welfare.3' But laws which authorize such inspections must respect the
individual's guaranties against unreasonable search and seizure.
Since the "reasonable" test depends upon the facts and circumstances-"
the total atmosphere of the case, ", and since this Court has held that a
statute which purports to delegate authority to certain officers be strictly
construed, 1 it is difficult to say that when a state officer commits a physi-
cal assult on an individual and subjects him to verbal abuse that the search
was reasonable."5 Certainly, no broad power bestowed upon the law enforce-
ment officer warrants an assault upon the person. As Justice Brandeis so
ably stated:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government offi-
cials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are com-
mands of the citizen.... To declare that the government may com-
mit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal
would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine




An unlawfully employed minor attempted to sue at law for injuries sus-
tained in the course of the employment. Held, the minor is limited to an
exclusive remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Winn-Lovett
Tampa v. Murpbree 73 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1954).
Workmen's Compensation statutes fall into four general types as regards
the treatment of unlawfully employed minors.
Type one makes no provision for minors unlawfully employed. Under this
type statute, one group of decisions permits the minor to sue at law,' the
22. Elliot v. Haskins, 20 Cal. App. 2d 591, 67 P. 2d 698 (1937); Camden Country
Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46 F. 2d 648 (2d Cir. 1930); Kelleher v. Minshull, 11 Wash.
380, 119 P.2d 302 (1941).
23. See note 7 supra. See Matherne, Search and Seizure- U.S. v. Rabinowitz, 21
TENN. L. REV. (1951).
24. See note 9 supra.
25. People v. Fields, 15 N.Y.S. 2d 561 (1939); Marshall v. Commonwealth, 140
Va. 541, 125 S.E. 329, (1924); c/., Reininger v. State, 49 Okl. Crim. 463, 60 P.2d
629 (1936).
26. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928).
1. Widdoes v. Laub, 33Del.4, 129 Art. 344 (1952); Lee v. Kansas City Public
Service Co., 137 Kan. 759, 22 P.2d 942 (1933); Win. B. Tilghman Co. v. Conway
150 Md. 525, 133 At. 593 (1926); Rock Island Coal Mining Co. v. Gilliam, 89 Oki.
49,213 Pac. 833 (1923); Knoxville News Co. v. Spitzer, 152 Tenn. 614, 279 SW 1043
(1926); Wlock v. Fort Drummer Mills, 98, Vt. 449, 129 Ad. 311 (1925).
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rationable being that no contract exists which can bring the minor under the
act.2 A second group of decisions places the minor under the act with a
consequent exclusive remedy;' the rationales of these decisions presenting
one or a combination of three theories: first, that a voidable contract of
employment exists which the minor can assert for his own benefit;4 second,
that the employer-employee relationship exists "in fact" and therefore the
minor should be within the act;' third, that the legislative intent and public
policy demand that the minor should be under the act.' Decisions within the
first group have been rendered where the minor sought to sue at law;, de-
cisions in the second group under the voidable contract theory have occur-
red where the minor sought compensation and the insurer was defending.
These decisions seem compatible: the minor may assert the contract and
claim compensation, but the employer does not have the contract, void as
to him, as a defense to the minor's common law suit. Unfortunately courts
do not recognize this distinction, as in Giuliano v. Greenberg,' where the
minor was denied a suit at law, the holding being basedon a case 0 where the
minor sought compensation and was allowed to assert the voidable con-
tract. The theory that the employer-employee relation existed"in fact" and
that the minor was therefore under the act may be placed in proper per-
spective by reference to the decisions holding that Workmen's Compensa-
tion is based solely on the contractual relation between the parties.", As to
the legislative intent and public policy theory, whatever that intent may be
in general, it is hard to believe that it should be so construed as to permit
a guilty employer to use his own criminal act against a child.
A second type of statute provides that only minors lawfully employed
shall be under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Decisions under this type
statute hold there must have been an employment which was lawful in all
respects, or else the minor must sue at law.-
2. See the compelling opinion in Wolff v. Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills, 185 App.
Div. 436, 173 N.Y.S. 75 (1918).
3. Greenberg. v. Giuliano, 131 Conn. 157, 38 A2d 436 (1944); Pierce's Case,
267 Mass. 140, 166 N.E. 636 (1929); Kociolowicz v. Tonowanda Corrugated Box
Co., 252 App. Div. 716, 298 N.Y.S. 844 (1937); Noreen v. William Vogel & Bros.
231 N.Y. 317, 132 N.E. 102 (1921); Humphries v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91,
135 S.E. 890 (1926); Rasi v. Howard Mfg. Co., 109 Wash. 524, 187 Pac. 327 (1920).
4. Kenez v. Novelty Compact Leather Co. et. al., 111 Conn. 229, 149 Atl. 679
(1930); Pierce's Case, 267 Mass. 140, 166 NE 636 (1929).
5. Noreen v. Win. Vogel & Bros., 231 N.Y. 317, 132 N.E. 102 (1921).
6. Humphries v. Boxley Bros. Co., 146 Va. 91, 135 S.E. 890 (1926).
7. Widdoes v. Laub, 33 Del. 4, 129 AtI. 344 (1925); Lee v. Kansas City Public
Service Co. 137 Kan. 759, 22 P.2d 943 (1933); Win. B. Tilghman Co. v. Conway,
150 Md. 525, 133 Att. 593 (1926); Wlock v. Fort Drummer Mills, 98 Vt. 499, 129 Atl.
311 (1925).
8. Kenez v. Novelty Compact Leather Co., 11 Conn. 229, 149 Atd. 679 (1930).
Pierce's Case, 267 Mass. 140, 166 N.E. 636 (1929).
9. 111 Conn. 157, 38 A.2d 436.
10. Kenez v. Novelty Compact Leather Co., 111 Conn. 229, 149 Atd. 679 (930).
11. Stulginski v. Cizauskas, 125 Conn. 293, 5 A2d 10 (1939).
12. Kruczkowski v. Polonia Pub. Co., 203 Mich. 211, 168 N.W. 932 (1918); West-
erlund v. Kettle River Co., 137 Minn. 24, 162 N.W. 680 (1917); Acklin Stamping Co.
v. Kutz, 98 Ohio St. 61, 120 N.E. 229 (1918); Stetz v. F. Mayer Boot and Shoe Co.,
163 Wis. 151, 156 N.W. 971 (1916); (permitting suit at law); Messmer v. Industrial
Board of Illinois, 282 Ill. 502, 118 N.E. 993 (1918) (denying compensation claim).
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Type three statutes include minors whether lawfully or unlawfully em-
ployed. Most decisions put the minor under the act;1'3 each statute and the
decisions appertaining thereto should be examined, however, since varia-
tions in wording may permit or compel a rationable peculiar to the jurisdic-
tion.
The fourth type of statute also includes minors lawfully or unlawfully
employed, but gives the minor unlawfully employed the option of claiming
compensation or suing at law. Under this type statute the court is relieved
of the burden of deciding the minor's position under the act.'
4
The position of an unlawfully employed minor under the Florida Work-
men's Compensation Act- has been determined once before;16 the court held
that although the legislature mentioned minors lawfully or unlawfully em-
ployed, they meant only those minors lawfully employable. The court was
criticized for equitable legislation." Good or bad, the rationale in Smith v.
Arnold 172 no longerexists, since with the enactment in 1953 of Florida Sta-
tutes Section450.111 (4) minors became lawfully employable for any purpose
in the discretion of Industrial Commission."
In Winn-Lovett Tampa v. Murpbree, the court bases its holding on..the
theory that since the minor is included in the definition of "employee" in
the Workmen's Compensation Act," and that Act contains provisions for ad-
ditional compensation to minors injured while employed in violation of the
Child Labor Law,1. plus a provision for the exclusiveness of liability of
the employer,21 the conclusion follows that the minor comes within the Work-
men's Compensation Act, and therefore has an exclusive remedy under it.
The court holds, "The contract of employment under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act is statutory, and the act is implicit in every employer-employ-
ee relationship, irrespective of the nature of the employment or.the age of
the parties. Such statutory contact arises not by consent or agreement of
the parties, but comes into being whether or not consent to be employed
can be given under the Child Labor Law."22 (Italics added). These state-
ments seem directly contrary to a rule well established in Florida, that-the
13. S.H. Kress &Co. v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 66 Ariz. 67, 182P.2d
931 (1947); Cummins v. J. J. Newberry Co., 211 Ark. 854, 203 S.W. 2d 187 (1947);
Haskins v. Cherry, 133 Ark. 206, 202 S.W. 691 (1918); Tarant v. Helena Bldg. &
Realty Co. 116 Mont. 319, 156 P.2d168 (1945).
14. Kijowski v. Times Publishing Corp., 298 Ill. App. 236, 18 N.E. 2d 754
(1938) A/f d. 372 111. 311, 23 N.E. 2d 703 (1939); Frye's Guardian v. Gamble Bros.,
188 Ky. 283, 221 S.W. 870 (1920); Damato v. DeLucia, 110 N.J.L. 380, 166Atl.
173 (1933) (holdin recovery eitLer at law or under Workmen's Comp. Act is a
complete bar to recovery in the other).
15. FLA. STAT. c. 440.
16. Smith v. Arnold 60 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1952).
17. 7 Miami L.Q. 218; 38'CORN. L.Q. 476.
17a. 60 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1952).
18. Save in pool rooms and other places specified in FLA. STAT. § 450.071,
which employments are absolutely prohibited.
19. FLA. STAT. § 440.02 ( 2 ); "The term 'employee' means...minors whether
lawfully or unlawfully employed.,
20. FLA. STAT. § 440.54.
21. FLA. STAT. §440.11.
22. Winn-Lovett Tampa v. Murphree, 73 So.2d at 291 (fIla. 1954).
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contract arises upon acceptance by the parties involved."3 In view of the
cases cited, and in view of the statute itself, which makes Workmen's
Compensation optional,14 it is difficult to see how the contract can be
statutory, or how it can arise without the consent of the parties.
The court is concerned with the consent to be employed. However, the
Child Labor Law is directed toward preventing the consent to employ; the
prohibition is pointed at the employer." Furthermore, the exclusiveness of
liability provided.for in the Workmen's Compensation Act- is contingent
upon the employer's bringing himself within the Act.- If a contract, or at
any rate an acceptance or consent by the employer is necessary, and that
acceptance consent or contract is prohibited by statute, is illegal, criminal
and void as to the employer, it is difficult to see how be can assert it Id
bring himself within the Workmen's Compensation Act as a defense to the
minor's suit. Therefore, it appears that the minor should be able to claim
compensation or sue at law. Optional remedies in this case do not appear
inconsistent with the statute, because the employer's position under the
Act should depend on the action taken by the minor.
This space is too short for a detailed analysis of the problem; but enough
appears to warn the reader of so-called trends: differences and changes in a
statute, complicated by glossed-over decisions too often form the basis for
inequitable conclusions. It would seem that those jurisdictions having
statutes giving the minor his option to claim compensation or sue at law
have reached the conclusion most compatible with the purpose of workmen's
compensation, the desire to give the minor maximum protection and the max-
im advanced by Lord Mansfield, ex dolo malo non oritur actio."
Shalle S. Fine
23. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. tBedingfield, 60 So.2d 489 (Fla.
1952); Florida Forest and Park Service et.al. v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472, 18 So.2d
251 (1944); Stansell v. Marlin, 153 Fla. 421, 14 So.2d 892 (1943); Chamberlain v.
Florida Power Corp.. 144 Fla. 719, 198 So.486 (1940).
24. FLA. STAT. § 440.05. See Vanlandingham v. Fla. Power ant Light Co., 154,
Fla. 629, 18 So.2d 678 (1944), (holding Workmen's Compensation optional).'
25. FLA. STAT. §§ 450.I41, 450.151 (proviLting penalties for employer); FLA.
STAT., §§ 450.121, 450.141, 450.051, 450.061 (prohibiting the employment: "No
minor... shall be employed. .. 19.
26. fLA. STAT. § 440.11: "The liability of an employer prescribed in section
440.10 shall be exclusive .... ''(Italics added).
27. ["LA. STAT. § 440.10 (1): "'lvery employer coming within the provisions of
ibis chapter .. - (Italics added). Obviously the liability prescribed is limited to
employers %ho are Aithin the act.
28. lolcomb v. Joanson, Cowp. 341, at 343 (1775).
